Algorithms and arithmetic for the implementation of cryptographic pairings

Nicolas Estibals

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







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with deg $h \le 1$ and deg $f = 3$




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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Set of points E(K) is a group
- ▶ In practice: K is a finite field \mathbb{F}_q
- $ightharpoonup E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a finite group

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
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
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$$[n]P = \underbrace{P + \cdots + P}_{n \text{ times}}$$

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- ► Use a cyclic subgroup of

$$E[\ell] = \{ P \mid [\ell]P = \mathcal{O} \}$$



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
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- ▶ Our favorite curves: E_3 : $y^2 = x^3 x \pm 1$
 - characteristic 3
 - supersingular

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)

Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group, P a generator, given $Q \in \mathbb{G}$, it is supposed to be hard to compute a such that

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
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
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
- ▶ Use this hard problem to design cryptographic protocols
- ▶ Diffie-Hellman key exchange:
 - Alice generates a secret integer a
 - Alice sends [a]P to Bob
 - Alice computes [a][b]P

- Bob generates a secret integer b
- Bob sends [b]P to Alice
- Bob computes [b][a]P

They both share the same secret: [ab]P








▶ Bilinear map:

$$e(P + P', Q) = e(P, Q) \cdot e(P', Q)$$

 $e(P, Q + Q') = e(P, Q) \cdot e(P, Q')$




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$$e([a]P,[b]Q) = e(P,Q)^{ab}$$



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
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- ▶ DLP should be hard on all the groups involved

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 - number of operations to break a cryptosystem
 - today's recommendation: 128-bit security
 2¹²⁸ operations

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For our favorite curve E_3 over $\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$

 $\ell \approx 2^{697}$ $\approx 2^{349}$ operations

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- ▶ Difficulty of the DLP on the roots of unity
 - embedding degree: k such that all roots lie in \mathbb{F}_{q^k}

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$$k = 6$$
, so DLP in $(\mathbb{F}_{3^{6.509}})^*$

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 - ★ very recent results (2013) Records by Joux and Göloğlu et al. records

Joux

Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux, Thomé Adj, Menezes, Oliveira, Rodríguez-Henríquez For our favorite curve E_3 over $\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$

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 $\approx 2^{132}$ operations

 $\lessapprox 2^{75}$ operations

Why cryptography and hardware implementations?


- ► Growth of numeric exchanges
 - many applications
 - ⋆ bank services
 - ★ secure firmware updates
 - ⋆ personal communications
 - * ...
 - many targets
 - * embedded electronics
 - * smart cards
 - * smartphones
 - ★ computers, servers
- Security implies non-trivial computations
- ► Need for hardware implementations
 - CPUs may be inadequate
 - limited resources









- Our target: Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
 - integrated circuit
 - matrix of simple configurable logic cells
 - programmable interconnection




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


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 - optimized for latency
 - optimized for compactness





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



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



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 - time (ms)
 - area (slices)
 - time—area product
- ▶ Different designs for the same computation
 - optimized for latency
 - optimized for compactness
 - optimized for throughput





Contributions

- [CHES 2009, IEEE TC 2011] ► Fast accelerator for pairings Joint work with Beuchat, Detrey, Okamoto and Rodríguez-Henríquez
 - parallel architecture
 - pipelined subquadratic multiplier
- ► Compact design for pairings reaching 128-bit security
 - composite extension fields

[Paring 2010]

hyperelliptic curves Joint work with Aranha, Beuchat and Detrey [CT-RSA 2012]

► Formulae for sub-quadratic multiplication Joint work with Barbulescu, Detrey and Zimmermann [WAIFI 2012]

- exhaustive search
- improved formulae for $\mathbb{F}_{3^{5m}}$

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 - improved formulae for F_{35m}

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
[WAIFI 2012]

Outline of the talk

- ► Compact design through composite extension fields
- ▶ Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- ► Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- ► Conclusion and Perspectives

► Computation of the pairing relies on

Miller functions: $f_{n,P}$




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
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
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- $g_{[n]P,[n']P}$ derived from the addition of [n]P and [n']P
- ► Tate pairing: $f_{\#E(\mathbb{F}_a),P}$
 - use an addition chain
 - in practice: double-and-add

$$\log_2 \# E(\mathbb{F}_q)$$
 iterations



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
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For $E_3(\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}})$	Tate pairing	
# iterations	509	
×	10330	
+	45170	
(.)3	8136	
$(.)^{-1}$	2	



$$\blacktriangleright$$
 # $E_3(\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}) = 3^{509} + 3^{255} + 1$

triple-and-add algorithm

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
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
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# iterations	509	254
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$(.)^{-1}$	2	1



- $+ \#E_3(\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}) = 3^{509} + 3^{255} + 1$
 - triple-and-add algorithm
- Many improvements
 - vertical elimination
 - use of some curve endomorphisms
 - * Frobenius: Ate


An arithmetic coprocessor



- ▶ Only need arithmetic operations in F₃509
 - implement a specialized processor
- Multiplication is critical
 - separate linear operations and multiplications
 - careful scheduling to keep multiplier busy

Operation count			
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
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
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


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 - careful scheduling to keep multiplier busy
- ▶ Inverse is only needed once: Itoh—Tsujii algorithm
 - no need for hardware support
- ▶ Synthesis results for $\mathbb{F}_{3^{509}}$: 9625 slices
 - almost fully occupy a Virtex 6 LX 75 T (82%)
 - computation time: \approx 4 ms


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
- ► Provides some arithmetic advantages
 - smaller datapath
 - efficient multiplication algorithm
- ▶ Allows Weil Descent based attacks on the curve
 - GHS: using the composite extension degree

$$\approx 2^{279}$$
 operations

SDHP: Granger's algorithm

$$\approx 2^{142}$$
 operations

limited effect on security




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
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
SDHP: Granger's algorithm


$$\approx 2^{142}$$
 operations


- limited effect on security
- Results
 - 1848 slices of the same Virtex 6 LX (15%)
 5.2 times smaller
 - compute a pairing in 1.6 ms
 2.5 times faster















Outline of the talk

- ► Compact design through composite extension fields
- ▶ Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- ► Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- ► Conclusion and Perspectives

$$C/K : y^2 + h(x)y = f(x)$$


with deg $h \le 2$ and deg $f = 5$



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
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
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
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
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


$${P_1, P_2} + {Q_1, Q_2} = {R_1, R_2}$$

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 Jac_C
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
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- ► More formally
 - Jacobian of the curve
 Jac_C
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- Chosen curves

$$H_2: y^2 + y = x^5 + x^3 + d,$$
 with $d \in \{0, 1\}$

- characteristic 2
- supersingular



$${P_1, P_2} + {Q_1, Q_2} = {R_1, R_2}$$

- ► Parameters for 128-bit security
 - Embedding degree k = 12
 - Field: $\mathbb{F}_{2^{367}}$

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•
$$\#\operatorname{Jac}_{C}(\mathbb{F}_{2^{367}}) = 2^{734} - 2^{551} - 2^{367} + 2^{184} + 1$$

► Our pairing algorithm

Algorithm	Tate (double-and-add)
# iterations	734

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 - Embedding degree k = 12
 - Field: **F**₂367
 - $\#\operatorname{Jac}_{C}(\mathbb{F}_{2^{367}}) = 4 \cdot 8^{244} 4 \cdot 2^{183} 2 \cdot 8^{122} + 1$
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 - Efficient octupling formula: octuple-and-add

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
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- ightharpoonup Implementation on the previous coprocessor adapted for $\mathbb{F}_{2^{367}}$
 - 1366 slices on the same Virtex 6 LX (12%)
 - 3.2 ms
 - comparable performances with the elliptic case



Outline of the talk

- ► Compact design through composite extension fields
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- ▶ Polynomial multiplication is an expensive arithmetic operation
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
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- ▶ Well-studied problem
 - asymptotic complexity
 - theoretical bilinear complexity
 - small and "cryptographic" size
- ► Five, six, and seven-term Karatsuba-like formulae, P. Montgomery (2005)
 - ad-hoc formulae
 - exhaustive search for five-term multiplication
 - non-exhaustive search for six and seven-term multiplications
- Our approach: improve the search algorithm


Generalization of the problem

▶ Model of a multiplication algorithm



Generalization of the problem

► Model of a multiplication algorithm



- ► Also true for any bilinear application
 - multiplication in extension fields
 - sparse products
 - matrix multiplications
 - . . .

Formulation in terms of vector space for an $n \times m$ multiplication over a given field K

▶ Represent the coefficients of the result and the products as elements of

V the *nm*-dimensional K-vector space generated by $\{a_ib_j\}_{0 \leq i < n, 0 \leq j < m}$

where the a_ib_i 's are seen as formal elements

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- \blacktriangleright The set $\mathcal G$ of the potential products to use in a formula: the generators
- ▶ Goal: find the optimal formulae (i.e. with a minimum number of products)
 - for increasing k until a solution is found
 - find each subset $W \subset \mathcal{G}$ of exactly k products
 - which gives a valid formula (i.e. that lineary generates the coefficients of the result)

$$\mathcal{T}\subset\operatorname{\mathsf{Span}}\mathcal{W}$$

Resolution

Naive approach: test each subset of *k* potential products

```
expand_family(\emptyset, \mathcal{G})
procedure expand_family(\mathcal{W}, \mathcal{H})
   if \#\mathcal{W} = k then
        if \mathcal{T} \subset \operatorname{\mathsf{Span}} \mathcal{W} then
             \mathcal{W} is a solution
    else
        while \mathcal{H} \neq \emptyset do
            Pick a h in \mathcal{H}.
            \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \setminus \{h\}
            expand_family(\mathcal{W} \cup \{h\}, \mathcal{H})
end procedure
```

▶ Complexity depends on

$$\binom{\#\mathcal{G}}{k}$$

Resolution

- ► Naive approach: test each subset of *k* potential products
- ▶ Better approach: test each vector space of dimension *k* generated by potential products

```
expand_subspace(\{0\}, \mathcal{G})
procedure expand_subspace(W, \mathcal{H})
   if dim W = k then
       if \mathcal{T} \subset W then
           W is a solution
   else
      \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \setminus W
       while \mathcal{H} \neq \emptyset do
          Pick a h in \mathcal{H}.
          \mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \setminus \{h\}
           expand_subspace(W \oplus Span(h), \mathcal{H})
end procedure
```

Complexity still depends on

$$\binom{\#\mathcal{G}}{k}$$

Resolution

- ► Naive approach: test each subset of *k* potential products
- Better approach: test each vector space of dimension k generated by potential products
- ► Even better approach: part of the solution is already known, use incomplete basis theorem

```
expand_subspace(T, \mathcal{G})
procedure expand_subspace(W, \mathcal{H})
   if dim W = k then
       if rank(W \cap \mathcal{G}) = k then
           W is a solution
   else
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► Complexity now depends on

$$\begin{pmatrix} \#\mathcal{G} \\ k - \operatorname{rank} \mathcal{T} \end{pmatrix}$$

Ring	$n \times m$	#9	k	# of	# of	# of	Computation
Itilig	" ~ ""	11 9	^	tests	solutions	formulae	time (1 core)
	2 × 2	9	3	1	1	1	0
	3 × 3	49	6	9	3	9	0
	4 × 4	225	9	$6.60 \cdot 10^{3}$	4	4	30 ms
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	6 × 6	3 969	14	$4.37 \cdot 10^9$			7 d
	6 × 6	(Sym.) 63	17	$8.08 \cdot 10^6$	6	54	18 s
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- ▶ Optimal formulae for sparse multiplication useful in pairing computation
 - in the genus-2 pairing, from 11 to 9 subproducts
- ▶ Optimal multiplication for the extensions $\mathbb{F}_{3^{5m}}$
 - 11 subproducts instead of 12 previously
 - yields a 5% improvement for the pairing on E_3

Outline of the talk

- ► Compact design through composite extension fields
- ▶ Pairing on genus-2 hyperelliptic curves
- ► Searching for efficient multiplication algorithms
- ► Conclusion and Perspectives

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- ► General method for cryptographic implementations
 - study mathematical structures
 - fix parameters thanks to cryptanalysis
 - algorithmic optimizations
 - choose the right arithmetic representation
 - implement different hardware accelerators

Perspectives

- ▶ Lower-level architecture
 - FPGA is a good prototyping platform
 - but with limited uses in real-life devices
 - develop skills in ASIC designs
 - power consumption awareness
- ► Integrate side-channel counter-measures
 - side-channel attacks are very effective threats
 - embedded systems need to be protected
- ▶ Use this method on different cryptographic primitives
 - scalar multiplication on hyperelliptic curves
 - lattice-based cryptography