Library-based Attack Tree Synthesis

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Abstract. We consider attack trees that can contain `OR`-, `AND`- and `SAND`-nodes. Relying on a formal notion of library inspired from context-free grammars, we introduce a generic attack tree synthesis problem that takes such a library and a trace as inputs. We show that this synthesis problem is NP-complete. The NP membership relies on an involved adaptation of the so-called CYK parsing algorithm. The NP hardness is established via a reduction from a recent covering problem. Finally, we show that the addressed synthesis problem collapses down to P for bounded-`AND`-arity libraries.

1 Introduction

In security analysis, *attack trees* [23] offer a representation to describe many attacks with brevity. They offer a reading of high-level *explanations* of attacks using different levels of abstractions. Also, they are convenient to perform quantitative analysis on attacks in order to select efficient counter-measures, as well as to identify attacker profiles in *e.g.,* forensic [21]. As general objects, they are useful in various situations in the industry: they are used for assessing the security of physical infrastructures [17], cyber security platforms such as voting systems [8] or specific machines like an ATM [9], and also to conduct quantitative analyses of a system that uses radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology [6].

We here informally introduce the attack tree model on a toy running example in physical security.

Example 1. A museum has two possible entries, both monitored by the same two cameras. The two cameras have a mutual protection system (distinct from the visual surveillance) so that they monitor each other: if a camera gets frozen while being monitored by the other, then an alarm is triggered. In order to neutralize a camera, the attacker can launch a virus on any camera: this virus immediately disables its ability to monitor the other camera, then, possibly after some time, it freezes the camera. Additionally, the freezing is temporary so that a frozen camera may recover from freezing.

Assume at least one camera has been infected by a virus. The attack tree of Figure 1 describes ways of attacking the museum to steal the painting: each node of the tree matches a task, and the children of a node match the subtasks. This tree displays three types of inner nodes, that specify how the subtasks should be accomplished. In `OR`-nodes, one subtask has to be achieved. In `SAND`-nodes, subtasks should be realized sequentially (from left to right). In `AND`-nodes, all

subtasks have to be executed in parallel. According to this tree, stealing the painting can be achieved for example by (1) turning the security off, then (2) entering the museum, and finally (3) taking the painting.



Fig. 1. An attack tree for stealing a painting in a museum with two doors, protected by two security cameras.

The design of attack trees can be a tedious and error-prone process if done manually: indeed, security experts may run into trouble as soon as the material they work on gets fairly big (lengthy log files, for example). In this context, gathering information becomes a complex task, and the resulting trees can get quite large. Hence, automated attack tree synthesis, even partial, is useful.

As shown in the Section2, many algorithms have been proposed for several variants of attack tree synthesis. In particular, some previous works rely on models for representing the accumulated expert knowledge about existing attack patterns, in order to synthesize attack trees [14,10]. Regrettably, the quality of the deployed algorithms can hardly be evaluated because of a lack of results on the intrinsic complexity of the tree synthesis problem.

It is therefore desirable to have a clear understanding of the attack tree synthesis problem(s) at a theoretical level in order to justify any algorithm. This requires a sleek definition of the attack tree synthesis problem, generic and simple enough to capture the core difficulty of the issue.

The present paper is about such a study. Our mathematical setting is the one of attack trees with a trace semantics, in the spirit of [3,2]. The main reason for it comes from the generic notion of trace. Indeed, traces can be found in most domains: as abstractions of system executions in verification, as sequences of events in monitoring, as log files in security, as plans in AI, as sequences of letters in formal languages and in bioinformatics, etc.

We define the notion of *library* as an abstract model for some expert knowledge, inspired from context-free grammars [12], and generic enough to resemble proposals from the literature on attack tree generation, and in particular the ones of [14] and [10].

Importantly, our approach is *model-free*, which makes it relevant for situations where the system model is unknown; only a trace, reminiscent of some system observation, matters. The synthesis decision problem, that we simply call the *attack tree synthesis problem* is defined as: given an input a *library* and an input *trace*, answers whether there exists an attack tree based on the given library whose trace semantics contains the input trace.

We prove that the attack tree synthesis problem is NP-complete. Noticeably, its NP-hardness is obtained by reducing the recently considered "Packed Interval Covering Problem" [22]. The NP-membership relies on a non-trivial adaptation of the classic Cocke–Younger–Kasami parsing algorithm [15]. Interestingly, we highlight the role of the `AND`-operator by showing a drop to the class P in the problem complexity if the arity of this operator is bounded in the input libraries.

The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we consider related works and their limits. In Sections 3 and 4, we settle the formal setting of attack trees with their trace semantics and with the library model, respectively. Section 5 contains the full synthesis problem study. The paper ends with a concluding section and research perspectives.

2 Related Work

We focus on the attack tree synthesis literature of the last two decades, in a chronological order; the reader interested in a survey on attack tree literature can refer to [26] (notice that the assumptions are quite diverse, but that there is an agreement that attack trees should help experts reasoning about ways of attacking a system). In some contributions, the formal semantics of attack trees is omitted, which makes hard stating properties of the generated trees, and in particular about what they describe. Also some works do not define the synthesis problem as a formal problem, making hard to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach with regards to the intrinsic complexity of the problem.

In Hong et al. [11], the semantics of the considered attack trees is not provided. The tree generation does not rely on any notion of library. The input is a set of attacks (that can be given or inferred as paths from some attack graph). Their procedure considers as the first step the naive tree obtained as the complete disjunction of all input attacks, where each attack is represented by the mere sequential conjunction of all its actions. In a second step, (although not told this way in the paper) the procedure resorts to controlled regular expression manipulations to make the former huge tree hopefully smaller. The purpose of this technique is mostly used to achieve quantitative analysis in an attack graph, and does not target readability of the tree. No meaning of the subtasks that inhabit the internal sub-nodes can be inferred by this procedure that artificially creates internal nodes from algebraic laws on regular expressions. Also, the approach lacks the use of `AND` operator that can provide more succinct trees and indeed, as explained by the authors, the synthesized trees have exponential size in the size of the input.

Vigo et al. [25] do not use a library and do not consider the sequential conjunction of subtasks (`SAND` operator). The input are a "program" representing the system and a point to reach in the former. The programs are described in so-called "value-passing quality calculus", a calculus which derives from the π-calculus. The system program with its point to reach is translated into a propositional formula that is interpreted as an attack tree (with intended meaning of disjunction and conjunction operators). However, since the internal nodes of the synthesized trees are abstract, the resulting trees are used more for quantitative analysis than for explaining ways of attacking.

Pinchinat et al. [18,19] present a tool for synthesizing attack trees. The method is very close to our approach, since it is based on a library, and on a bottom-up construction of the tree inspired by context-free grammar syntactic analysis. The used library is defined aside the synthesis functionality; it can be defined manually in the tool, but may also be imported from previous projects. However, the procedure does not support operator `AND`.

In the setting of Ivanova et al. [13], the authors suggest a high-level language intended to turn a graph, a so-called "graphical system model", into an attack tree with the intention to make the graph more readable. Those graphical models specify an initial state of some system – vertices represent elements (such as doors, agents, information, and so on), and the attacker has to reach some final configuration. The translation from one setting to another does not rely on a precise semantic framework. The translation from the graph to an attack tree is generic, not taking advantage of any specific expert knowledge. The library is implicitly based on ad-hoc patterns (with first-order logic features) correlated with fixed ontologies (locations, actors, processes, items). As a result, the obtained trees are unbalanced, and not readable. Also, only disjunction and sequential conjunction are considered.

Gadyatskaya et al. [10] define a library-based generic synthesis problem parameterized by the semantics of attack trees. The library is called a refinement specification. However, the paper focuses on the particular series-parallel graph (SP) semantics, where the `AND` operator has a truly concurrent meaning. Surprisingly, the authors restrict to SP graphs without any `AND` operator, that is as a set of traces. This prevents to address the synthesis problem for arbitrary refinement rules. Also, the paper does not provide the complexity analysis of the addressed synthesis problem. The tree models we consider here are not based on actions (at the leaves), but it can be established that our semantics coincides with the SP semantics if the `AND` operator is discarded. Our synthesis problem can therefore be seen as a restriction of their work to a singleton set of single traces, but also as an extension of it as we allow `AND` operators.

Jhawar et al. [14] consider the issue of automating the completion of an attack tree rather than synthesizing one, by an iterated top-down approach. A criterion based on annotations of nodes with preconditions and postconditions, makes it possible to attach subtrees from some library at some leaves. The logical setting to describe the annotations lacks dynamic features (such as temporal modalities) amenable to the use of sequential conjunction.

In [5], Audinot et al. study the non-emptiness of an attack tree, in a framework similar to what we consider here: given an attack tree, they query the existence of an attack described by the input tree. Our problem can be read as the dual of this problem since the trace is known but a tree has to be found.

3 Attack Trees and Their Trace Semantics

We consider the setting of [3], where attack tree leaves are labeled by atomic goals, but due to our concern, we equip them with a trace semantics instead of a path semantics, in natural manner. Indeed, traces are mere abstraction of finite paths (in some transition system), by replacing each state along the path by its set of true facts; thus a trace is a finite sequence of facts. In formal approaches facts are modeled by abstract *propositions* in a set $Prop = \{p, q, r, \ldots\}$.

Intuitively, an atomic goal at a leaf of an attack tree describes the achievements of some primitive task by providing two Boolean formulas that we call the *precondition* and the *postcondition*. An achievement is a finite sequence of facts called a *trace*, formalized as a finite sequence of *valuations* over a set of some propositions. Now, a trace *achieves an atomic goal* if the precondition of that goal holds at the beginning of the sequence and the postcondition of that goal holds at its end. The *trace semantics* of a non-leaf attack tree is given in a compositional manner by means of operations on (sets of) traces, such as concatenation.

We now get into the formal definitions.

3.1 Attack Trees

Formally, an attack tree is a tree whose leaves are *atomic goals* of the form $\langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$, where ι and γ are Boolean formulas over a set of atomic propositions $Prop$, called the *precondition* and the *postcondition* respectively. Each inner node of an attack tree is labelled by some operator `OP` ranging over `OR` (disjunction), `SAND` (sequential conjunction) or `AND` (conjunction), and is called an *`OP`-node*.



Fig. 2. The formal attack tree for the museum example.

Example 2. Figure 2 shows a formalization of the informal attack tree from Figure 1, with 3 inner nodes and 5 leaves. Propositions occurring in the atomic goals of the leaves are interpreted as follows: $\texttt{monitor}_i$ means "camera i is being monitored (by the other camera)", $\texttt{frozen}_i$ means "camera i is frozen", $\texttt{enter}_j$ means "entered in museum via door j", and `hasPaint` means "the painting was stolen". Therefore, the atomic goal $\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle$ models the task of hacking camera 1: launching the virus immediately stops camera 1 from monitoring camera 2 and eventually freezes camera 1. Symmetrically, goal $\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle$ regards the hacking of camera 2. We will elaborate on the camera-hacking phase later, in Subsection 3.4. Also, goal $\langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{enter}_a \rangle$ models the task of entering the museum via door a without surveillance.

Definition 1 (Attack tree). *An* attack tree τ *over Prop is:*

- *either a leaf of the form* $\langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$ *where* ι, γ *are Boolean formulae over Prop;*
- *or an expression* $\texttt{OP}(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m)$ *where* `OP` *is the operator* `OR`, `AND` *or* `SAND`, $m \geq 1$ *is the arity, and* $\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m$ *are attack trees.*

In Definition 1 we confuse a node and the subtree rooted at that node. This is standard when trees are defined inductively.

Example 3. The attack tree given in Figure 2 is

$$\begin{array}{l} \texttt{SAND}(\ \texttt{AND}(\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle, \langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle), \\ \qquad \texttt{OR}(\langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{enter}_a \rangle, \langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{enter}_b \rangle), \\ \qquad\quad \langle \texttt{enter}_a \vee \texttt{enter}_b \textbf{ to } \texttt{hasPaint} \rangle) \end{array}$$

The second central objects of concern are *traces*.

3.2 Traces and operations on sets of traces

Executions of systems are alternating sequences consisting of states and actions. In our setting for attack trees, the focus is put on states. In fact, the states themselves are not "observable" along an execution, but only the truth values of facts/propositions about them. A truth value of propositions is formally captured by the standard notion of *valuation* in propositional logic. Thus an observation of a (finite) execution, usually called a *trace* [7], is a finite sequence of valuations; two successive valuations in a trace correspond to a state transition in the observed system.

We now formally define *traces*, sets of traces, and particular operations over languages that provide the semantics of operators `OR`, `SAND` and `AND` in attack trees. For the rest of this section, we fix a set *Prop* of propositions.

A *valuation* is a subset of *Prop* with the meaning that propositions in this set are true while the others are false; for the empty valuation $\varnothing$, all propositions are thus false. We therefore write 2^{Prop} for the set of valuations on the set *Prop*,

with typical element $\nu \in 2^{Prop}$. Given a Boolean formula φ over $Prop$, we write $\nu \models \varphi$ to denote that ν satisfies φ.

Traces are finite sequences of valuations, and we denote by ε the empty sequence. Given a trace $t \in (2^{Prop})^*$, the *length* $|t|$ of t is defined as its number of valuations. For $1 \leq i \leq |t|$, the i^{th} valuation of t is denoted by $t(i)$. We set $t.first = t(1)$ and $t.last = t(|t|)$ and we denote by $t[i, j]$ the subsequence of t starting at position i and ending at position j. For instance, if $t = \nu_1\nu_2\nu_3\nu_4\nu_5$, then $t.first = \nu_1$, $t.last = \nu_5$ and $t[2, 4] = \nu_2\nu_3\nu_4$.

Example 4. Consider the trace $\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}$ $\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}$ $\varnothing$ $\{\texttt{frozen}_1\}$ $\{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\{\texttt{hasPaint}, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ of length 7 from the museum example. It reflects the scenario where, during the first two timesteps, both cameras work, camera 1 is monitored and camera 2 is not. At the third step, camera 1 is not any more monitored. Then, camera 1 is frozen, before camera 2. Next, the intruder enters the building via door b while both cameras are frozen, and finally steals the painting while the cameras are still frozen.

In the following, we may write traces with arrows between their valuations in order to emphasize the underlying state transitions that take place: $t = \nu_1 \to \nu_2 \to \nu_3 \to \nu_4 \to \nu_5$.

Regarding the trace semantics of attack trees that will be given in Definition 4, the `OR` operator will be understood as the union operation over sets of traces, whereas the two other operators `SAND` and `AND` will be given less classic interpretations that we present now.

3.3 Synchronized concatenation

The *synchronized concatenation* $\odot$ slightly differs from the usual concatenation in formal languages and conveys the notion of sequential executions of scenarios; it will provide the semantics of the `SAND` operator in attack trees.

Definition 2 (Synchronized concatenation).
The synchronized concatenation *of two traces is defined only if the last valuation of the former is equal to the first valuation of the latter, and simply concatenates the two traces by merging this common element. Formally,*

$$\nu_1 \dots \nu_n\nu \odot \nu\nu'_1\nu'_2 \dots \nu'_m = \nu_1 \dots \nu_n\nu\nu'_1 \dots \nu'_m.$$

Example 5.
$\{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\odot$ $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\{\texttt{hasPaint}, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\} = \{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ $\{\texttt{hasPaint}, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$; the synchronized concatenation is possible thanks to the common matching valuation $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$.

The synchronized concatenation $\odot$ is associative, so that binary $\odot$ suffices. We lift the synchronized concatenation to sets L, L' of traces by letting

$$L \odot L' = \{t \odot t' \mid t \in L, t' \in L' \text{ and } t \odot t' \text{ is defined}\}.$$

3.4 Parallel composition

The *parallel composition* written $\between$ is adapted from [3] to traces. This operation reflects the meaning of achieving subgoals in a concurrent manner, and aims at capturing what the AND operator expresses in attack trees. We motivate its definition on an example with the concurrent achievement of two atomic goals: consider the AND-node from Figure 2 and the following trace (a prefix of the trace in Example 4) realizing a successful hacking of both cameras, namely goal $\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle$ and goal $\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle$.

$$\underbrace{\{\texttt{monitor}_1\} \to \{\texttt{monitor}_1\} \to \overbrace{\varnothing \to \{\texttt{frozen}_1\}}^{\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle}}_{\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle} \to \{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\} \quad (1)$$

Right from the start, camera 1 gets a virus and cannot monitor camera 2 ($\texttt{monitor}_2$ is false). The observation does not change for one step, and then, camera 2 gets infected too ($\texttt{monitor}_1$ turns false). Then, camera 1 gets frozen first ($\texttt{frozen}_1$), and next camera 2 does too ($\texttt{frozen}_2$). Realizing the conjunction of the hacking subgoals means that they are executed concurrently: any transition of the global hacking task falls under one of the hacking subgoals, and the global task is embedded in the achievement of both subgoals. On the contrary, the following trace does not reflect a conjunction of the two hacking subgoals because the second transition does not serve any of the hacking subgoals.

$$\underbrace{\{\texttt{monitor}_1\} \to \{\texttt{monitor}_1, \texttt{frozen}_1\}}_{\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle} \to \underbrace{\{\texttt{monitor}_2\} \to \{\texttt{monitor}_2, \texttt{frozen}_2\}}_{\langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle}$$

In concrete terms, a virus is launched on camera 1, then camera 1 gets frozen, then a virus is launched on camera 2 while camera 1 gets back to normal operation, then finally, camera 2 gets frozen. In this scenario, the second hacking task starts too late and the alarm is triggered (camera 1 is able to notice the discrepancy in camera 2's behaviour). The AND-node of the tree expresses that it is necessary for the two hacking subgoals to take place with some overlapping of their transitions to be successful. This is formalized in Definition 3 as *parallel composition* of traces which can be interpreted as follows: if one sees a trace, of length n, as displaying some "activity", every transition (*i.e.,* action) along this trace corresponds to a 1-length subinterval $[k, k+1] \subseteq [1, n]$, while subgoals correspond to arbitrary subintervals. In the example, the camera 1 hacking subgoal of the 5-length trace of Expression (1) corresponds to subinterval $[1, 4]$ and the camera 2 hacking subgoal corresponds to subinterval $[3, 5]$. Therefore each transition along this trace serves at least one of the two camera hacking subgoals.

More formally, let us say that the intervals $I_1, \ldots, I_m$ *cover* an interval I whenever

$$\bigcup_{\ell=1}^{m} I_\ell = I \text{ and each } [k, k+1] \subseteq I \text{ is contained in some } I_\ell.$$

We can now proceed to the formal definition of the parallel composition.

Definition 3 (Parallel composition). *A trace t is a* parallel composition *of traces $t_1, \ldots, t_m$ if there are m intervals $I_1, \ldots, I_m$ that cover $[1, n]$ for some positive integer n and such that $t[I_\ell] = t_\ell$, for every $1 \leq \ell \leq m$. We also simply say that traces $t_1, \ldots, t_m$* cover *trace t.*

Example 6. Figure 3 shows that the trace $t = \nu_1 \ldots \nu_7$ is a parallel composition of traces t_1, t_2 and t_3 with respective intervals $[1, 2]$, $[4, 7]$, $[2, 5]$. Indeed, all transitions $\nu_1 \to \nu_2$, $\nu_2 \to \nu_3$, $\ldots$, $\nu_6 \to \nu_7$ are covered. On the contrary, t is not a parallel composition of t_1, t_2 and t'_3 since the only interval candidates are respectively $[1, 2]$, $[4, 7]$, $[3, 5]$, but none of them fully includes the subinterval $[2, 3]$. In other words, the transition $\nu_2 \to \nu_3$ is not covered.



Fig. 3. The trace t is a parallel composition of t_1, t_2, t_3 but not of t_1, t_2, t'_3.

The parallel composition reflects the conjunctive execution of activities and not the conjunction of the effects of these activities, which is a legitimate interpretation of the `AND` operator in attack trees (see the series-parallel graph semantics considered in [10]). Typically, requiring to open and to close a door does mean to attain a situation where the door is both open and closed.

Traces $t_1, \ldots, t_m$ may cover several traces, i.e. may have several parallel compositions. We let $\between(t_1, \ldots, t_m)$ be the set of parallel compositions of $t_1, \ldots, t_m$. For instance, $\between(\nu'\nu\nu, \nu\nu\nu'') = \{\nu'\nu\nu\nu'', \nu'\nu\nu\nu\nu''\}$. We lift the parallel composition to sets $L_1, \ldots, L_m$ of traces by letting

$$\between(L_1, \ldots, L_m) = \bigcup_{t_1 \in L_1, \ldots, t_m \in L_m} \between(t_1, \ldots, t_m).$$

It should be remarked that the synchronized concatenation $\odot$ is associative, so that binary $\odot$ suffices, while this is not the case for $\between$ in general: for example, $\nu_1\nu_2\nu_3\nu_4 \in \between(\nu_1\nu_2, \nu_3\nu_4, \nu_2\nu_3)$, but $\between(\between(\nu_1\nu_2, \nu_3\nu_4), \nu_2\nu_3) = \varnothing$ because $\nu_1\nu_2$ and $\nu_3\nu_4$ do not share any valuation.

3.5 Trace semantics of attack trees

Now, we define the *trace semantics* of attack trees. Operators in attack trees are interpreted as operations on trace sets: `OR` means union $\cup$, `SAND` means synchronized concatenation $\odot$, and `AND` means parallel composition $\between$.

Definition 4 (Trace semantics of attack tree). *The* trace semantics *of an attack tree τ is a set of traces $L(\tau) \subseteq (2^{Prop})^*$, inductively defined on τ:*

$$\begin{array}{ll} L(\langle \iota \ \textbf{\textit{to}} \ \gamma \rangle) & = \{t \in (2^{Prop})^* \mid t.first \models \iota \text{ and } t.last \models \gamma\}; \\ L(\texttt{OR}(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m)) & = L(\tau_1) \cup \ldots \cup L(\tau_m); \\ L(\texttt{SAND}(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m)) & = L(\tau_1) \odot \ldots \odot L(\tau_m); \\ L(\texttt{AND}(\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_m)) & = \text{⩓}(L(\tau_1), \ldots, L(\tau_m)). \end{array}$$

Since the SAND operator relies on the associative operation $\odot$, we may sometimes assume for convenience and w.l.o.g. that the degree of the SAND-nodes is 2. In contrast, such an assumption would not hold for operator AND since ⩓ is not associative.

Example 7. Revisiting the attack tree τ from Example 3, the following trace from Example 4 is a possible trace of the museum example that can be explained by the tree τ, *i.e.,* that is in $L(\tau)$:

$$\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}\varnothing\{\texttt{frozen}_1\}\{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$$
$$\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}\ \{\texttt{hasPaint}, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}.$$

Indeed, first its prefix $\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}\{\texttt{monitor}_1\} \varnothing \{\texttt{frozen}_1\}\{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ belongs to $L(\texttt{AND}(\langle \neg\texttt{monitor}_2 \ \textbf{to} \ \texttt{frozen}_1\rangle, \langle \neg\texttt{monitor}_1 \ \textbf{to} \ \texttt{frozen}_2\rangle))$, as a parallel composition of $\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}\{\texttt{monitor}_1\}\varnothing\{\texttt{frozen}_1\} \in L(\langle \neg\texttt{monitor}_2 \ \textbf{to} \ \texttt{frozen}_1\rangle)$ and $\varnothing\{\texttt{frozen}_1\}\{\texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\} \in L(\langle \neg\texttt{monitor}_1 \ \textbf{to} \ \texttt{frozen}_2\rangle)$. Second, its factor $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\} \in L(\langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \ \textbf{to} \ \texttt{enter}_a\rangle)$, thus its belongs to the trace semantics of the subtree of τ rooted at the OR-node. Third, its suffix $\{\texttt{enter}_b, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}\{\texttt{hasPaint}, \texttt{frozen}_1, \texttt{frozen}_2\}$ belongs to the trace semantics of the last child of the SAND-node.

4 Libraries

The attack tree synthesis problem seems trivial: the single-node tree $\langle \top \ \textbf{to} \ \top\rangle$, where formula $\top$ means tautologically true, explains any trace! In order to synthesize interesting attack trees, we consider a *library*, that is a set of *refinement rules*, alike a context-free grammar rules. We will as much as possible keep close to notations introduced in [10]: for instance, we use ρ to denote a refinement rule.

In a context-free grammar style, we consider $\mathcal{G}$ a finite set of *non-terminal goals*, with typical elements g, g_1, g_2, and *terminal goals* that are atomic goals $\langle \iota \ \textbf{to} \ \gamma\rangle$ (where ι, γ are Boolean formulas).

Definition 5 (Refinement rules and library). *A* refinement rule (over $\mathcal{G}$) *ρ is either a so-called* elementary rule *$g \lhd \langle \iota \ \textbf{\textit{to}} \ \gamma\rangle$ where ι, γ are Boolean formulas; or a rule $g \lhd \texttt{OP}(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$ where OP is an operator, $m \geq 1$, and $g_1, \ldots, g_m \in \mathcal{G}$. A refinement rule $g \lhd \texttt{OP}(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$* refines *$g$. The* arity *of a refinement rule is* 0 *if it is elementary, and the arity of the operator OP appearing in the rule otherwise.*

A library *$\mathcal{L}$ over $\mathcal{G}$ is a finite set of refinement rules (over $\mathcal{G}$). The* size *of $\mathcal{L}$ is the total number of non-terminal goal occurrences that appear in all its rules, both in left-hand and right-hand sides of rules.*

Example 8. Let us continue with the museum example where we add the proposition `incenter` read as "the intruder is in the control center". The following set of rules $\mathcal{L}_{\text{museum}}$ is library (and relies on the vocabulary of Example 2), where non-terminal goals are sentences written in italic to emphasize their role in our model of a library.

$$\begin{cases} \textit{go to center} & \lhd \langle \top \textbf{ to } \texttt{incenter} \rangle \\ \textit{blow up a bomb} & \lhd \langle \texttt{incenter} \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle \\ \textit{enter via door } a & \lhd \langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{enter}_a \rangle \\ \textit{enter via door } b & \lhd \langle \texttt{frozen}_1 \wedge \texttt{frozen}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{enter}_b \rangle \\ \textit{take} & \lhd \langle \texttt{enter}_a \vee \texttt{enter}_b \textbf{ to } \texttt{hasPaint} \rangle \\ \textit{disable camera } 1 & \lhd \langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_2 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_1 \rangle \\ \textit{disable camera } 2 & \lhd \langle \neg \texttt{monitor}_1 \textbf{ to } \texttt{frozen}_2 \rangle \\ \textit{steal} & \lhd \texttt{SAND}(\textit{disable cameras}, \textit{enter}, \textit{take}) \\ \textit{disable cameras} & \lhd \texttt{AND}(\textit{disable camera } 1, \textit{disable camera } 2) \\ \textit{disable cameras} & \lhd \texttt{SAND}(\textit{go to center}, \textit{blow up a bomb}) \\ \textit{enter} & \lhd \texttt{OR}(\textit{enter via door } a, \textit{enter via door } b) \end{cases}$$

Goal *go to center* represents reaching the control center (without any precondition, which is written $\top$), while goal *blow up a bomb* represents setting up a bomb that will disable both cameras while being in the control center. The other goals are clear. Note that there are two rules that refine goal *disable cameras* which reflects different ways of disabling both cameras. Allowing for different refinement rules for an abstract goal is of utter importance because libraries are filled by experts analysing different systems: for example, the rule to hack a USB key may drastically vary depending on the underlying OS. Encapsulating alternatives into a single `OR` means that they may occur in the same system. Having a different rule for each alternative means that they correspond to different systems.

We now fix a library $\mathcal{L}$ over some set of non-terminal goals $\mathcal{G}$. We define $\mathcal{L}$-attack trees, in the spirit of what was called a "correct tree" in [10]: intuitively, they are attack trees obtained by iteratively applying refinement rules of the library on leaf-nodes until the leaves correspond to atomic goals.

Definition 6 ($\mathcal{L}$-attack tree). *An* $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree *is an attack tree* τ *(in the sense of Definition 1) equipped with a mapping* ℓ *that maps every node of* τ *onto a non-terminal goal of* $\mathcal{G}$ *in such a way that:*

- *if* x *is a leaf* $\langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$*, then the rule* $\ell(x) \lhd \langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$ *is in* $\mathcal{L}$*;*
- *if* x *is a node* $\texttt{OP}(x_1, \ldots, x_k)$ *then the rule* $\ell(x) \lhd \texttt{OP}(\ell(x_1), \ldots, \ell(x_k))$ *is in* $\mathcal{L}$*.*

The label $\ell(x)$ of a node in Definition 6 is a non-terminal goal. This non-terminal goal arising from the library carries information, such as text – as done in Example 8, or a CVE identifier[1]. It is this information that makes $\mathcal{L}$-attack trees readable to experts.

[1] CVE is a dictionary of publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exposures https://cve.mitre.org/cve/.

Example 9. Figure 4 shows two $\mathcal{L}_{\text{museum}}$-attack trees for $\mathcal{L}_{\text{museum}}$ defined in Example 8.



Fig. 4. Two $\mathcal{L}_{\text{museum}}$-attack trees.

We say that the non-terminal goal g *derives* the trace t if there exists an $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree τ whose root's label is g and such that t is in $L(\tau)$.

Given a library $\mathcal{L}$, we can always manage to find an equivalent library $\mathcal{L}'$ where all SANDs are binary, in the sense that the trace semantics of an $\mathcal{L}'$-attack tree is equal to trace semantics of some $\mathcal{L}$-attack trees, and vice versa. Note that $\mathcal{L}'$ can be computed in polynomial time in the size of $\mathcal{L}$.

In the rest of this paper, we assume that every refinement rule based on SAND operator has arity 2. Table 1 sums up the formal notions defined so far.

Formal notions	**Intuitive meanings**
a trace	an observed attack (e.g. a log file)
an attack tree (Def. 1)	an explanation of an observed attack
a non-terminal goal	a high-level attack objective
a refinement rule	a known attack tree pattern
a library (Def. 5)	a set of known attack tree patterns
an $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree (Def. 6)	an explanation of an observed attack constructed with the known attack-tree patterns in $\mathcal{L}$

Table 1. Important formal notions defined in the paper.

5 Attack Tree Synthesis

The attack tree synthesis problem consists in building a tree (if any) that *explains* an observed trace t (e.g. a log file) in terms of a given library $\mathcal{L}$. Formally, we address the underlying decision problem for analyzing the complexity for this synthesis problem, but the developed algorithm does build a tree.

Definition 7 (Attack tree synthesis problem).

- *Input: a library $\mathcal{L}$, a trace $t \in (2^{Prop})^*$.*
- *Question: is there an $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree τ such that $t \in L(\tau)$?*

The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of the following theorem.

Theorem 1. *The attack tree synthesis problem is* NP*-complete. Furthermore, the synthesis problem restricted to libraries in which the arity of* `AND` *is bounded is in* P*.*

For proving the NP-hardness of the attack tree synthesis problem, we identify a decision problem at the core of the synthesis problem: the "Packed Interval Covering Problem" [22].

5.1 A detour on the Packed Interval Covering Problem

The Packed Interval Covering Problem (PIC) is a cover problem, where one has to cover a given interval using one interval from each given pack. It is defined as follows.

- Input: a non-empty interval I of integers and a family of finite sets $P_1, \ldots, P_m$ (*packs*) of subintervals of I.
- Question: are there subintervals $I_1 \in P_1, \ldots, I_m \in P_m$ such that $I = \bigcup_{k=1..m} I_k$?

Example 10. We borrow the example in [22]: for interval $[1, 9]$, there are three packs $\{[1, 6], [5, 9]\}$, $\{[1, 3], [4, 6], [7, 7]\}$, $\{[4, 4]\}$. Interval $[1, 9]$ can be covered by selecting $[5, 9]$, $[1, 3]$ and $[4, 4]$ in the respective packs, as shown in Figure 5.

Theorem 2 ([22]). PIC *is* NP*-complete.*

5.2 NP-hardness of the synthesis problem

We establish a reduction from PIC to the attack tree synthesis problem.

Consider an arbitrary instance of PIC with target interval $I = [1, N]$ and packs $(P_k)_{1 \leq k \leq m}$, each of the form $P_k = \{[m_j^k, n_j^k] \mid 1 \leq j \leq |P_k|\}$.

We now describe an instance $\langle \mathcal{L}, t \rangle$ of the attack tree synthesis problem as follows. Take N distinct propositions $p_0, \ldots, p_N$.

First, define trace $t = \{p_0\} \ldots \{p_N\}$ to encode the target interval $[1, N]$: each subtrace $\{p_{i-1}\}\{p_i\}$ of t of length 2 is intended to match integer $i \in [1, N]$.

Second, the library $\mathcal{L}$ contains exactly the following rules.



Fig. 5. Example of an instance of the Packed Interval Covering Problem.

- Rule $g_{\text{select}(k,j)} \lhd \langle p_{m_j^k - 1}$ **to** $p_{n_j^k} \rangle$ for every $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and every $j \in \{1, \dots, |P_k|\}$ that amounts to requiring that if the j-th interval $[m_j^k, n_j^k]$ of pack P_k is selected, then it is covered;
- Rule $g_{\text{pack}(k)} \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_{\text{select}(k,1)}, \dots, g_{\text{select}(k,|P_k|)})$, for every $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ requiring to select one of the $|P_k|$ intervals in the pack P_k;
- Rule $g_{\text{union}} \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_{\text{pack}(1)}, \dots, g_{\text{pack}(m)})$ expressing that one must select an interval in each pack P_k;

Example 11. For the PIC instance of Example 10, we get trace

$$t = \{p_0\}\{p_1\}\{p_2\}\{p_3\}\{p_4\}\{p_5\}\{p_6\}\{p_7\}\{p_8\}\{p_9\}$$

and the following library:

$$\begin{cases} g_{\text{union}} \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_{\text{pack}(1)}, g_{\text{pack}(2)}, g_{\text{pack}(3)}) \\ g_{\text{pack}(1)} \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_{\text{select}(1,1)}, g_{\text{select}(1,2)}) \\ g_{\text{pack}(2)} \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_{\text{select}(2,1)}, g_{\text{select}(2,2)}, g_{\text{select}(2,3)}) \\ g_{\text{pack}(3)} \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_{\text{select}(3,1)}) \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{l} g_{\text{select}(1,1)} \lhd \langle p_0 \textbf{ to } p_6 \rangle \\ g_{\text{select}(1,2)} \lhd \langle p_4 \textbf{ to } p_9 \rangle \\ g_{\text{select}(2,1)} \lhd \langle p_0 \textbf{ to } p_3 \rangle \\ g_{\text{select}(2,2)} \lhd \langle p_3 \textbf{ to } p_6 \rangle \\ g_{\text{select}(2,3)} \lhd \langle p_6 \textbf{ to } p_7 \rangle \\ g_{\text{select}(3,1)} \lhd \langle p_3 \textbf{ to } p_4 \rangle \end{array}$$

The obtained instance $\langle \mathcal{L}, t \rangle$ is computed in polynomial time from the PIC instance $\langle I, P_1, \dots, P_m \rangle$. Clearly, the instance $\langle \mathcal{L}, t \rangle$ of the attack tree synthesis problem is positive if, and only if, the original PIC instance $\langle I, P_1, \dots, P_m \rangle$ is positive. Indeed, there is a correspondence between the choice of intervals in packs, and the children of nodes labelled by $g_{\text{pack}(1)}, \dots, g_{\text{pack}(m)}$ whose respective semantics exhibits m subtraces that cover the full trace t.

5.3 NP-membership of the synthesis problem

The following table shows the correspondence between some refinement rules and context-free grammars (CFG) rules in formal languages. Notice that there is no grammar rules counterpart for refinement rules with an `AND` operator.

Refinement rule	CFG production rule
$g \lhd \langle \iota$ **to** $\gamma \rangle$	$X \to a$
$g \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_1, g_2)$	$X \to Y \mid Z$
$g \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g_1, g_2)$	$X \to YZ$

Still, we are able to design an algorithm based on a variant of the classic bottom-up parsing algorithm "Cocke–Younger–Kasami algorithm" (CYK) [15,27,24]. The original algorithm answers whether some input context-free grammar can generate some input word. It relies on a *dynamic programming* solution that computes, for each subword by increasing length, the set of non-terminals that generate it.

Algorithm design As in CYK, we handle sets $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ that collect goals of $\mathcal{G}$ that derive the subtrace $t[i,j]$. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on the mere dynamic programming anymore since the three operators do not necessarily make use of decreasing intervals. The following example illustrates the phenomenon with an artificial example of library.

Example 12. For $Prop = \{p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4\}$, take trace $t = \{p_1\}\{p_2\}\{p_3\}\{p_4\}$ and the following library $\mathcal{L}$:

$$\begin{cases} \rho_1 : g \lhd \texttt{OR}(g') & \rho_4 : g \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g', g'') & \rho_7 : g' \lhd \langle p_1 \textbf{ to } p_2 \rangle \\ \rho_2 : g' \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g, g) & \rho_5 : g \lhd \langle p_2 \textbf{ to } p_3 \rangle & \rho_8 : g'' \lhd \langle p_3 \textbf{ to } p_4 \rangle \\ \rho_3 : g \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g', g) & \rho_6 : g' \lhd \langle p_1 \textbf{ to } p_1 \rangle & \end{cases}$$

Figure 6 shows an $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree for the trace t. Although the nodes marked * and the node marked ** are at different levels in the tree, we will see that both arise when computing $\texttt{Goals}[1,3]$ to parse subtrace $t[1,3] = \{p_1\}\{p_2\}\{p_3\}$.



Fig. 6. An $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree for t.

Let us zoom on a bottom-up parsing of the trace t, by successively increasing the length of the subintervals $[i,j]$ to compute $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ that derives $t[i,j]$.

During the treatment of the 1-length interval $[1,1]$, g' is put in $\texttt{Goals}[1,1]$ thanks to Rule ρ_6, which allows next to add g by Rule ρ_1; $\texttt{Goals}[2,2]$, $\texttt{Goals}[3,3]$ and $\texttt{Goals}[4,4]$ are empty.

We skip the computation for intervals of length 2, and focus on the treatment of interval $[1,3]$: in order to obtain the subtree of Figure 6 rooted at node marked * for subtrace $t[1,3]$, the parsing procedure should have added goal g in

$\texttt{Goals}[1,3]$ according to Rule ρ_3 (corresponding to the marked ** node) before adding g' (node *) thanks to Rule ρ_2. But because of the mutual recursivity of the rules, it seems difficult to know *a priori* which of Rule ρ_2 and Rule ρ_3 should be considered first.

In order to face the potential inability to exhibit a hierarchy of the rules for an arbitrary input library, we propose an algorithm that iterates over rules until stabilization for each interval of the input trace.

Importantly, the ability to solve the synthesis problem even for libraries with mutual recursivity between rules is not a mere technical achievement but a true need: indeed, libraries may be fed incrementally by uncoordinated experts, which prevents us from requiring any sort of (in)dependencies between rules. Thus restricting to non recursive libraries (as for the museum Example 8) would be a very limited solution.

Regarding the technical aspects of our algorithm, the parsing of SAND-rules is handled with a minor adaptation of the CYK algorithm because of the tiny difference between classic concatenation and synchronized concatenation. On the contrary, since AND-rules of libraries do not have any counterpart in CF grammars, we resort to a novel method based on non-deterministically guessing one interval per subgoal, hence a non-deterministic algorithm.

Algorithm pseudo-code Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code of our non-deterministic algorithm that decides the attack tree synthesis in polynomial-time. As in CYK, we consider each interval $[i,j]$ of $[1,n]$ by increasing length (line 1), and we compute $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ (in the **repeat-until** loop, lines 2-18) that is a set of goals that derive $t[i,j]$ (possibly the set of exactly all such goals when the *right* non-deterministic choices are taken). The **repeat-until** loop stops when $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ *stabilizes*, that is when nothing has been added to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ in the last iteration.

We iterate over all the rules of the library and update $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ according to the semantics given in Definition 4. For a rule $g \lhd \langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$, we add the goal g to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ if ι holds at time i and γ holds at time j. For a rule $g \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$, as long as there is a goal g_k in $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$, we add g to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$. For a rule $g \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g_1,g_2)$, if there is a mid-position t between time i and j such that g_1 is in $\texttt{Goals}[i,t]$ and g_2 is in $\texttt{Goals}[t,j]$, we add g to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$. For a rule $g \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$, we first non-deterministically choose intervals $I_1,\ldots,I_m$ included in $[i,j]$. In the case $I_1,\ldots,I_m$ is a covering of $[i,j]$ and goals $g_1,\ldots,g_m$ are respectively in $\texttt{Goals}[I_1],\ldots,\texttt{Goals}[I_m]$, we add g in $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$. Note that if g is added in $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$ then the rule $g \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$ can be applied to construct an attack tree. The reverse is false: it might be the case that the rule $g \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$ can be applied although g is not added to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$. Nevertheless, if the rule $g \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$ can be applied then there is an execution in which the goal g is added to $\texttt{Goals}[i,j]$.

At the end, the input is accepted exactly when $\texttt{Goals}[1,n]$ is not empty, that is, when the algorithm found that there is an attack tree for the full trace t.

Proposition 1 states the main properties of Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$: it has an accepting execution iff there is an $\mathcal{L}$-attack tree whose semantics contains t.

1: **for** all intervals $[i, j]$ of $[1, n]$ by increasing length **do**
2: | **repeat**
3: | | **for** all rules ρ in $\mathcal{L}$ **do**
4: | | | **match** ρ **do**
5: | | | | **case** $g \lhd \langle \iota$ **to** $\gamma \rangle$:
6: | | | | **if** $t(i) \models \iota$ and $t(j) \models \gamma$ **then**
7: | | | | | $\texttt{Goals}[i, j] := \texttt{Goals}[i, j] \cup \{g\}$
8: | | | | **case** $g \lhd \texttt{OR}(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$:
9: | | | | | **if** there is $1 \leq k \leq m$ and $g_k \in \texttt{Goals}[i, j]$ **then**
10: | | | | | | $\texttt{Goals}[i, j] := \texttt{Goals}[i, j] \cup \{g\}$
11: | | | | **case** $g \lhd \texttt{SAND}(g_1, g_2)$:
12: | | | | | **if** there is $i \leq t \leq j$ such that $g_1 \in \texttt{Goals}[i, t]$ and $g_2 \in \texttt{Goals}[t, j]$ **then**
13: | | | | | | $\texttt{Goals}[i, j] := \texttt{Goals}[i, j] \cup \{g\}$
14: | | | | **case** $g \lhd \texttt{AND}(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$:
15: | | | | | **non-deterministically choose** $I_1, \ldots, I_m \subseteq [i, j]$
16: | | | | | | **if** $I_1, \ldots, I_m$ covers $[i, j]$ and $g_1 \in \texttt{Goals}[I_1]$ and $\ldots$ and $g_m \in \texttt{Goals}[I_m]$ **then**
17: | | | | | | | $\texttt{Goals}[i, j] := \texttt{Goals}[i, j] \cup \{g\}$
18: | | **until** $\texttt{Goals}[i, j]$ stabilises
19: **if** $(\texttt{Goals}[1, n] \neq \varnothing)$ **accept else reject**

Proposition 1.

1. *Executions of* `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$ *have length in* $poly(size(\mathcal{L}) + |t|)$.
2. *(Soundness) If there is an accepting execution of* `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$, *then there is an* $\mathcal{L}$*-attack tree* τ *such that* $t \in L(\tau)$.
3. *(Completeness) If there is an* $\mathcal{L}$*-attack tree* τ *such that* $t \in L(\tau)$, *then there is an accepting execution of* `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$.

Proof. Consider an execution of `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$. At each iteration of the **repeat-until** loop (lines 2-18), the set $\texttt{Goals}[i, j]$ is increasing and bounded by finite $\mathcal{G}$. Choosing non-deterministically $I_1, \ldots, I_m \subseteq [i, j]$ consists in choosing $2m$ numbers in $[i, j]$, which can be done in polynomial-time. The rest is polynomial hence Point 1.

Also, the invariant "for every execution of `attackTreeSynthesis`$(\mathcal{L}, t)$, $\texttt{Goals}[i, j]$ is included in the set of goals that derive $t[i, j]$" entails Point 2. Finally, it suffices to consider the execution that chooses the right intervals at line 15 to get Point 3.

By Proposition 1, the attack tree synthesis problem is in NP. To achieve the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to restrict to libraries with bounded-arity `AND`-rules.

5.4 Libraries with bounded-arity AND-rules

It can be observed that the combinatorics of the unbounded AND operator contributes to the problem's complexity. By bounding the AND operator arity in library $\mathcal{L}$, the resulting subclass of the synthesis problem falls into P.

To see this, observe that bounding the AND operator arity yields a polynomial number of covers, so that line 15 of Algorithm 1 can be replaced by a **for**-loop over all covers that executes a polynomial number of times in the arity m.

6 Conclusion

We have presented a mathematical setting that addresses an attack tree synthesis problem. In this contribution, we rely on a formal trace semantics of attack trees inspired from the path semantics proposed, *e.g.,* in [3,4]. Our setting exploits the ontology of library whose rules describe how a subgoal can be refined into a combination of subgoals; such combinations rely on any of the classic tree operators OR, SAND, and AND. The synthesis problem has two inputs: a library and a trace. It consists in building an attack tree whose refinements are provided by the input library and whose semantics contains the input trace. We have established that the (associated decision) problem is NP-complete. However, the proposed algorithm is only polynomial in the size of the trace. This is good news for the two following reasons. First, traces might be long objects (*e.g.,* log files). Second, the exponential blow up caused by the arity of AND rules in libraries should be tamed in practice: the library is often fixed, and a manually entered AND-rule in this library is unlikely to have a huge arity. We have implemented our algorithm in a humble educative prototype that the interested reader may find at http://attacktreesynthesis.irisa.fr/.

Regarding synthesis, our algorithm can be easily extended to keep track of subtrees: each time a goal is added in Goals, there is a matching subtree that we could build – as done for the classic CYK algorithm to return the syntactic tree of a parsed word. This is classic in dynamic programming and can still be exploited in our case.

Recently, new operators have been proposed to combine subgoals, among which are weak variants of existing operators, as done in [16] and [20]. We claim that our algorithm can be easily extended to deal with these operators.

This contribution opens several perspectives both theoretical and practical.

Theoretical level (1) We can investigate the use of first-order formulas in atomic goals $\langle \iota \textbf{ to } \gamma \rangle$, which would encompass the kinds of rules in [14] and [13]. We foresee the need for pattern-matching techniques or Robinson's unification that may impact the theoretical complexity of the problem. (2) We may also relax the problem by not synthesizing a single tree, but a minimal number of trees where each one parses a piece of the input trace. (3) We have to go beyond the case of a single trace, and synthesize a tree whose semantics contains (or equals) an input finite set of traces. This has already been addressed in [10] for the restricted case of OR and SAND-rules only, and regrettably with an incomplete procedure; the

authors write that their procedure "either generates a correct tree or aborts" (in contrary, our approach is complete, see Point 3 of Proposition 1).

Practical level We foresee two main tracks. The first track regards the lengthy traces arising from concrete log files. Even if our algorithm is polynomial in this parameter, scalability is still an issue. We may explore abstractions of traces (*e.g.,* modulo stuttering equivalence), or subclasses of libraries with efficient parsing methods (*e.g.,* of the type LL(1)). The second track is ambitious and aims at bridging the gap between formal libraries and libraries in practice, such as the knowledge base of adversary tactics MITTRE ATT&CK[2]. We are not aware of any significant advance but of a humble recent degree project [1][3]. This topic should become very hot in the near future.

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